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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc. v.
Mayor of Boston, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2039, 425 N.E.2d 346.

CLAUSE-

1.

INTRODUCTION

Public works construction is a $55 billion industry' that has a
broad based impact on the national economy. In Massachusetts
alone, $675 million worth of public c~nstruction projects were initi
ated in 1980.2 The industry is regulated by a myriad of statutes
ranging from who is qualified to bid for a particular project3 to the
terms of performance of an awarded contract.4 One such statute,S
which provided employment preferences for Massachusetts residents
in public works construction projects, was recently invalidated by
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts Council
of Construction Employers, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston (MCCE).6
The challenged statute created an absolute employment prefer
ence for residents whenever private contractors engaged in public
works projects of the commonwealth. 7 The purpose of the statute, as
found by the court, was to ease unemployment in the state and to
ensure that public funds were spent in maximizing benefits to the
1. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 30, Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employ
ers, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2039, 425 N.E.2d 346 (citing BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONSTRUCTION REP.: VALUE OF NEW
CONSTRUCTION PUT IN PLACE, c. 30-80-12, (1980}).
2. Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9 n.6, Massachusetts Council of Constr.
Employers, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2039, 425 N.E.2d 346.
3. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §§ 44A-44H (West 1982).
4. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 39F-39L (West 1979 & Supp. 1982).
5. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 26 (West 1982). The statute reads in perti
nent part:
In the employment of mechanics and apprentices, teamsters, chauffeurs and la
borers in the construction of public works by the commonwealth, . . . or by
persons contracting or subcontracting for such works, preference shall first be
given to citizens 0/ the commonwealth who have been residents 0/ the common
wealth for at least six months at the commencement of their employment. . .
and who are qualified to perform the work to which the employment relates;
. . . and if they cannot be obtained in sufficient numbers, then to citizens of the
United States, and every contract for such work shall contain a provision to this
effect.
fd. (emphasis added).
6. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2039, 425 N.E.2d 346.
7. fd. at 2044, 425 N.E.2d at 350.
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locality where the monies were raised. s
The major participants in the construction industry representing
both labor and management,9 filed a complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment that the residency requirements of the statute and a hiring
quota system established by an Executive Order of the city of Boston
were unconstitutional. lO The court in the MCCE decision declared
8. Id. at 2045, 425 N.E.2d at 350. The court deduced these general purposes from
those purposes argued by the defendants: The promotion of employment of residents
and the concomitant alleviation of unemployment; the reduction of economic and social
costs to the commonwealth arising from unemployment; and the generation of secondary
economic activities and tax revenues resulting from retention of public funds within the
commonwealth. Brief for Defendant Dep't of Labor & Ind. at 5, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh.
2039,425 N.E.2d 346.
9. The individual plaintiffs were the Massachusetts State Building and Construc
tion Trades Council AFL-CIO, the Building and Construction Trades Council of the
Metropolitan District AFL-CIO, individual contractors incorporated in Massachusetts,
individual contractors incorporated in Rhode Island, and members of sixteen trade un
ions. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2039 n.l, 425 N.E.2d at 346 n.1. The defendants were the
City of Boston, the Boston Redevelopment Authority, the Economic Development and
Industrial Corporation, and the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries. The
Boston Jobs Coalition, Inc. intervened as a defendant. Id. at 2039 n.2, 425 N.E.2d at 346
n.2.
10. Id. at 2040-43, 425 N.E.2d at 347-49. The Executive Order of the city of Bos
ton established a hiring preference quota system. In any construction project to which
the city was a signatory to the construction contract, worker hours on a craft-by-craft
basis had to be performed by: at least fifty percent bona fide Boston residents; at least
twenty five percent minorities; and at least ten percent women. Id. at 2040 n.4, 245
N.E.2d at 347 n.4.
A single justice, who heard the original action, reserved and reported ten questions
to the full courts:
I. Is the application of G. L. c. 149, § 26, to construction projects involv
ing Federal assistance invalid because it is in conflict with the Federal statutes
(and rules and regulations derived therefrom) authorizing such assistance and/
or is such application of the statute invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution?
2. Does G. L. c. 149, § 26, conflict with the privileges and immunities
clause, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, the contract clause
and the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, and does it conflict
with Articles I, X, and XII of the Massachusetts Constitution?
3. Does G. L. c. 149, § 26, conflict with the obligations of the plaintiffs
under the National Labor Relations Act, and is it therefore invalid under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution?
4. Is the application of the residency aspects of Executive Order to con
struction projects involving Federal assistance invalid because in conflict with
the federal statutes (and rules and regulations derived therefrom) authorizing
such assistance and/or is such application of the Executive Order invalid under
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution?
5. Does the Executive Order, by establishing a residents' preference, con
flict with the privileges and immunities clause, the due process clause, the equal
protection clause, the contract clause and the commerce clause of the United
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that the residency preference requirement of the statute ll violated
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States
Constitution. 12
This note will examine the history of the privileges and immuni
ties clause and the various judicial tests proposed to construe it. Ad
ditionally, the note will examine the MCCE case and criticize that
decision's misplaced reliance on other authority. I3
Privileges and immunities litigation has been confused and en
tangled with decisions that have cast ambiguity on the principles of
States Constitution, and does it conflict with Article I, Article [X) and Article
XII of the Massachusetts Constitution?
6. Do the residency aspects of Executive Order conflict with the obliga
tion ofthe plaintiffs under the National Labor Relations Act, and is it therefore
invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution?
7. Are the residency aspects of Executive Order invalid under Section 6
or Section 7(5) of Article 89 of the amendments to the Constitution of Massa
chusetts, and/or G. L. c. 43B, § 13 (the Home Rule Procedures Act)?
8. Does the BRA violate the provisions ofG. L. c. 121A by conditioning
approval of application for tax status under that Chapter upon an applicant's
acceptance of Section 8 of the BRA's 'Rules and Regulations Governing Chap
ter 121A Projects in the City of Boston'?
9. Are the residency aspects of the Executive Order invalid as beyond the
inherent power of the Mayor under the City Charter?
10. Is the conditioning of a developer's application for a UDAG [Urban
Development Action Grant) upon his agreement to abide by the residency as
pects of the Executive Order in conflict with 42 U.S.c. sec. 5301 ef seq. and/or
is such conditioning invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution?
Id. at 2042 n.9, 425 N.E.2d at 348-49 n.9.
This note will not examine the rulings on the Executive Order of the city of Boston
held to violate the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, Id. at 2052-54, 425
N.E.2d at 354-55, or the ruling that neither the statute nor the Executive Order conflicted
with the National Labor Relations Act and therefore did not violate the federal preemp
tion doctrine under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 2043,
425 N.E.2d at 349. The Executive Order was recently declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers Inc., 103 S. Ct.
1042 (1983). The subject of this note was not at issue upon the appeal.
II. Only the residency preference of the statute was before the court. The six
month durational requirement of the statute was not at issue. This aspect of the statute
required that in order for a person to be given the hiring preference under the statute, the
person must have been a resident of the state for at least the six months prior to his
commencing employment. Id. at 2041 n.6, 425 N.E.2d at 348 n.6. See supra note 5.
Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
12. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2039, 425 N.E.2d at 346. The Privileges and Immuni
ties clause of the United States Constitution reads as follows: "The Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S.
CON ST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I.
13. Eg., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). See infra notes 95-105 and ac
companying text.
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the clause. 14 With the recent increase in privileges and immunities
clause litigation,15 the court had an opportunity to develop a consis
tent basis for privileges and immunities analysis. It will be demon
strated that instead of examining and weighing the facts, the court
has misplaced its reliance on other authority by disregarding the
valid distinctions between the cases l6 and applied the proper stan
dard of analysis only in a cursory fashion.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The language of the privileges and immunities clause was
adopted from Article IV of the Articles of Confederation. 17 That
article declared its purpose as promoting "mutual friendship and in
tercourse among the people of the different states in the Union."18
The clause was adopted by the Constitutional Convention without
great debate and placed in Article IV, along with other sections that
concerned interstate relationships.19
The Supreme Court has attempted to establish a standard to
effectuate the purpose of the privileges and immunities clause. The
result has been a line of cases that have created varying tests which
have caused difficulty and confusion for the courts in their
analysis. 20
The first major case to consider the application of the privileges·
and immunities clause was Coifield v. Coryel/,21 in which Circuit
14. See, e.g., Note, Lookingfor Privileges and Immunities, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 89
(1975).
15. A search of all reported cases in the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals, the
circuit courts and the highest court of each state for the years 1950 through 1982 revealed
that privileges and immunities litigation is increasing. For the 10 year period from 1950
to 1959, II cases discussed the privileges and immunities clause. This number rose to 25
for the 1960 to 1969 period, and to 88 for the 1970 to 1979 period. For the period from
1980 to June 1982, the number of cases was 46, which, if extrapolated to 1989, would
predict 184 cases on this subject. This progression shows that the number of cases that
consider the privileges and immunities clause more than doubles in every ten years.
16. See infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
17. Knox, Prospective Applications of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the United States Constitution, 43 Mo. L. REV. 1,5 (1978).
18. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV. "The better to secure and perpetuate
mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union,
the free inhabitants of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice ex
cepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several
States. . . ." Id.
19. 3 M. Farrand, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 112, 173
(1911).
20. See, Note, supra note 14, at 94.
21. 6 F. C. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (Justice Bushrod Washington on circuit).
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Court Justice Bushrod Washington upheld a New Jersey statute that
made it unlawful for nonresidents to gather shellfish in New Jersey
waters. 22 In determining whether the clause encompassed shellfish
ing, Justice Washington examined the. rights at issue. 23 Under his
standard, the privileges and immunities clause would apply to those
rights
which are, in their nature,Jundamental; which belong, of right, to
the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times,
been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent,
and sovereign. . . . [Including the] right of a citizen of one state
to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise. 24

Therefore, the Court's early judicial interpretation of the clause es
tablished that only fundamental rights were protected by the clause,
and that the court could determine which rights were (and, con
versely, which were not) fundamental.2 5
In Paul v. Virginia ,26 the Court changed the focus of its analysis
of the privileges and immunities clause from protecting the funda
mental rights of citizens of a free government to that of protecting
nonresidents from discrimination by states and insuring them the
same rights as residents of those states. 27 Against a privileges and
immunities clause challenge, the Court upheld a Virginia statute that
required out-of-state insurance companies to place a deposit of thirty
to fifty thousand dollars with the state treasury in order to do busi
ness in the state. 28 The Court reasoned that a corporation was not a
person under the privileges and immunities clause and that the
clause did not secure, in a foreign state, the special privileges granted
to a citizen by his own state. 29 Rather, the clause secured to a non
resident the identical privileges and immunities that the state
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 555.
fd. at 550-55.
Id. at 551-52 (emphasis added).
See id.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
Id. at 180.
fd. at 168.
29. Id. The creation of a corporation is the exercise of a state law. This special
privilege cannot extend outside the boundaries of the sovereignty in which it was created.
Therefore. another state is totally free to recognize or place conditions on its recognition
of an out-of-state corporation. Any other construction of the privileges and immunities
clause would destroy the independence and harmony of the states the clause was envi
sioned to create. Id. at 181.
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granted to its own citizens under the laws and constitution of that
state. 30
III.

THE MODERN INTERPRETATION

The case of Toomer v. Witsell 31 announced what has been char
acterized as the modem approach to privileges and immunities
clause protection. 32 In Toomer, the Court struck down a South Car
olina statute, as violative of the privileges and immunities clause,
because it limited commercial access to migratory shrimp in the
three-mile maritime belt off the state's coast. 33 The statute limited
commercial access by imposing a license fee one hundred times
greater for each nonresident shrimp boat. 34 The Court created a
"substantial reason" test as the criterion for privileges and immuni
ties protection. 35 The Court stated that the clause did not create an
absolute right to equal treatment, but that it did bar discrimination
against nonresidents unless there were substantial reasons for the dis
crimination, beyond the mere fact that the nonresidents were not cit
izens of a particular state. 36 The clause allowed disparity of
treatment of nonresidents, but only when supported by "valid in
dependent reasons"37 and an indication that nonresidents were the
peculiar source of the evil at which the statute was aimed. 38
From this, it is evident that the task of the judiciary is to deter
mine whether such independent reasons exist and whether they war
30. Id. at 180.
31. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
32. See Note, supra note 14, at 99; Note, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV: Fundamental Rights Revived, 55 WASH. L. REV. 461 (1980).
In Paul, the Court had established an absolute state discrimination standard. If one
state gave its citizen a certain right then that right must also be extended to nonresidents.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180. Toomer is a more flexible standard and allows state discrimina
tion of nonresidents when a valid justification can be shown. See infra note 37 and ac
companying text.
33. 334 U.S. at 399. The Court found that the practical effect of the statute was
exclusionary and that the record did not show any supporting evidence that nonresidents
were a peculiar source of evil. The record did not show, for example, that nonresidents
use larger boats or that they were in fact the cause of higher costs of enforcement. Id. at
398.
34. Id. at 395.
35. Id. at 396.
36. Id.
37. Id. The Court stated that the purpose of the privileges and immunities clause
was to help "fuse into one Nation" the several states and to ensure to a nonresident the
same privileges which the citizens of the state enjoy. Id. at 395. For some recent exam
ples of valid discrimination under the privileges and immunities clause, see infra notes
96- \0 I and accompanying text.
38. 334 U.S. at 398.
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rant the degree of discrimination created by the state action. 39 In
making this determination, the Court must be sensitive to the state's
role of proscribing means to alleviate local problems. 40
Toomer drastically shifted privileges and immunities analysis
from an absolute dichotomous approach of whether a fundamental
right existed to a more flexible standard of state justification of dis
criminatory actions. 41 The fundamental rights approach of Coifield
has been displaced by the anti-discrimination approach of the post
Toomer decisions. 42
The two most recent Supreme Court decisions involving the
privileges and immunities clause, however, reveal that the present
Court is uncertain of the Toomer approach and is cautiously consid
ering reversion to the fundamental rights analysis.
In Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission ,43 the court upheld a
Montana hunting license statute that charged nonresidents as much
as twenty-five times more than a resident for the equivalent license. 44
39. Id. at 396.
40. Id.
41. Professor Tribe suggests that this change in focus is so thorough that the funda
mental rights approach is no longer important. The fundamental rights doctrine was first
used as a limitation on the rigid approach of judicial intervention of state rights. Today,
with a more t1exible standard of allowing the states to discriminate in only properly justi
fied situations, there is no longer the need to narrow the scope of the privileges and
immunities clause. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 411 n.16 (1978).
42. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Austin v. New Hampshire,
420 U.S. 656 (1975); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S.
415 (1952); Rubin v. Glaser, 83 N.J. 299, 416 A.2d 382 (1980); Lung v. O'Chesky, 94
N.M. 802,617 P.2d 1317 (1980); Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d
909,423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979), cerro denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980); Construction and Gen.
Laborers Union Local 563 v. City of St. Paul, 270 Minn. 427, 134 N.W.2d 26 (1965);
State V. Nolfi, 141 N.J. Super. 528, 358 A.2d 847 (1976).
In Mullaney V. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952), the Supreme Court struck down a
statute charging nonresidents ten times more than residents for a fishing license. Because
the state did not show a reasonable relation between the higher license fees or any addi
tional costs to the territory, the Court held that the statute violated the privileges and
immunities clause. Id. at 417-18.
43. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
44. Id. at 388. The license scheme charged residents $9.00 for a license to hunt elk
only and $30.00 for a combination license to hunt elk, deer, black bear and game birds.
Nonresidents could not purchase a license to hunt elk only and were required to
purchase the combination license at a price of $225.00. Id. at 373-74.
The Baldwin Court first cited Paul V. Virginia, as setting out the purpose of the
privileges and immunities clause to eliminate state discrimination of nonresidents by en
suring nonresidents the same privileges and immunities that residents enjoy. Id. at 380;
see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. The Court then quoted Hague V. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939), for the proposition that it was the well settled view in privileges and
immunities analysis that a person did not carry with him fundamental rights merely be
cause of his citizenship; but that a nonresident visiting any state had the same privileges
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In reconciling the different approaches used by other courts,45 the
Court set up two categories that distinguished the cases: those situa
tions that were permitted because they reflected the fact that the na
tion is composed of individual states;46 and those "other" situations47
that are prohibited because they hinder the formation, purpose and
development of the nation. 48 The Court concluded that the privi
leges and immunities clause only protects those rights that are vital
to the maintenance of the nation as a single entity.49 Therefore, the
first step in the analysis must be a determination into which category
the challenged statute falls;50 that is, whether it concerns a funda
mental right. After such a determination, the Court would then con
sider whether the challenged statute could be justified by the state
under the Toomer substantial reason test. 51
Using this two step analysis, the Court found that elk hunting
was not a fundamental right under the first part of the test and up
held the statute as not violative of the privileges and immunities
clause. 52 The decision was based upon an ownership theory53 which
presupposes that a state has a right to control and regulate resources
that it owns, provided that the state does not interfere with interstate
commerce, the proper exercise of federal power, or the right to pur
sue a livelihood in another state as protected by the clause. 54
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, strongly criticized the renewal of
the fundamental rights limitation. 55 He believed that it was time to
clearly state what had been implicit in modem privileges and immu
nities analysis: that a fundamental rights approach should have no
and immunities as the residents of that state. 436 U.S. at 381 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 511 (1939». The Court then recognized valid situations where residency might
be used to distinguish between persons, as, for example, in the areas of voting rights,
qualifications of an elected state official and the application of state laws and services.
436 U.S. at 383.
45. See supra notes 21-42 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 44.
47. The Court did not give specific examples of this category and did not decide
the range of activities that would fit into this category. 436 U.S. at 388.
48. Id. at 383.
49. Id.
50. /d. at 383-84.
51. Id. at 386-87.
52. Id. at 388.
53. See infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
54. 436 U.S. at 385-86 (citations omitted). The reasons stated by the Court were:
Elk hunting is a sport, not a means of livelihood; nonresidents were not totally excluded
from hunting elk; and the elk supply is finite and must be carefully tended in order to
preserve it. Id. at 388.
55. Id. at 402 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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weight in considering whether a state's discrimination has violated
the clause. 56 Rather, he believed the Court's primary concern should
be the state's justification for its discrimination.57
One month later, Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous
Court in Hicklin v. Orbeck,58 invalidated an Alaska law which re
quired that qualified state residents be hired preferentially over
equally qualified nonresidents for any employment resulting from an
oil and gas lease, easement or right of way when the State of Alaska
was a party to those leases or permits. 59 Justice Brennan, relying on
the reasoning of his dissent in Baldwin, required a state justification
of the discrimination without considering a fundamental rights anal
ysis. 60 Justice Brennan found the statute did not meet the substantial
reason test: first, it swept more broadly than necessary to achieve the
goal of relieving unemployment since that could have been accom
plished by a statute specifically aimed at the unemployed;61 second,
there was no evidence that the nonresidents were the peculiar source
of Alaska's unemployment;62 and third, Justice Brennan rejected the
theory that Alaska's ownership of oil and gas gave the authority to
place conditions on the sale or lease of that resource. 63 The statute
was "an attempt to force virtually all businesses that benefit[ed] in
some way from the economic ripple effect" of Alaska's oil and gas
resources, to prefer employment of state residents. 64 The Court be
lieved Alaska's ownership of these resources did not constitute suffi
cient justification for the pervasive discrimination against
nonresidents that the statute required. 65
56. Id.
57. Id. Justice Brennan then looked at the case under the Toomer approach of the
substantial reason test and determined that there was no justification for the discrimina
tion as a method to conserve elk, a means to reduce the costs of additional enforcement
due to nonresidents, or based upon the right of a state to control the resources that it
owns. Id. at 402-06.
58. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
59. Id. at 520.
60. Id. at 525-26.
61. Id. at 528. The statute preferred employed, as well as unemployed, residents
over nonresidents. The Court believed the statute was overly broad and was not directed
at the problem it sought to remedy. Id. at 527-28.
62. Id. at 526. The Court distilled the substantial reasons required by Toomer to
be the lack of less restrictive alternatives. Further, the Court determined that Alaska's
unemployment was due to the lack of education and job training of residents and be
cause of the geographical remoteness of residents from job opportunities. Id. at 526-27.
63. Id. at 528-31.
64. Id. at 531.
65. Id. at 531. State ownership is an important factor to be considered in a privi
leges and immunities analysis. Id. at 528-29. See Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d
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Although the Court does not always agree on the proper frame
work for analyzing the privileges and immunities clause, courts and
commentators agree that the clause facilitates national unification by
giving citizens who venture outside their own state some federal pro
tection. 66 The issue is the extent of that protection and Hicklin de
fined the substantial reason test as the appropriate means to
determine that extent. 67 The test was to examine whether first, the
presence or activity of nonresidents was the peculiar source ofthe evil
the state was attempting to remedy; and second, if the discrimination
practiced against nonresidents bore a substantial relation to the
problem they represented. 68 This balancing approach, then, weighs
the interests of the state against the discriminatory actions toward
nonresidents. Hicklin did not hold that a residency preference stat
ute was invalid per se ,69 but rather held that the challenged statute
514,524,399 N.E.2d 909, 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878,883 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909
(1980). In McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876), the Supreme Court created an
absolute exception which allowed a state to do as it saw fit with the resources that it
owned. In McCready, a nonresident plaintiff challenged a Virginia statute which prohib
ited nonresidents from planting shellfish in Virginia waters. The Court ruled that Vir
ginia owned the tidewaters and their beds and therefore, had the power to use those areas
as they saw fit. Id. at 396. The McCready doctrine, which was based solely on an owner
ship theory, exempted a state from scrutiny under the privileges and immunities clause.
See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 384-86; Ebbeson v. Board of Public Educ. in Wilmington, 18
Del. Ch. 37,43-45, 156 A. 286, 289 (1931) (The McCready exception applies to public
revenues in construction of public works.) Over time, the McCready doctrine has been
reduced from an absolute exception to a crucial factor in determining whether the state's
discrimination against nonresidents violates the privileges and immunities clause. See
supra note 127 and accompanying text.
66. Courts have held the following to be privileges protected by the privileges and
immunities clause: the right to have equal treatment with respect to taxes, Austin v. New
Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); to have access to hospitals, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973); to enjoy freedom of travel among the states, Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525
(1919); to engage in business, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); and to own, sell
and deal with personal property in another state, Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
See also Knox, supra note 17.
67. 437 U.S. at 525-26. Another view reconciles Baldwin and Hicklin as requiring
a two-step analysis. The first step is to determine whether a fundamental right has been
infringed. If so, the first step is met, and the court will reach the second step and apply
the substantial reason test. See Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term - Forward: On Dis
covering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 78-86; Recent Cases, Commerce
Clause-Privileges and Immunities Clause-State Hiring Discrimination Against Nonresi
dents, 12 AKRON L. REV. 346; Note, The Privileges and Immunities Clause: A Reaffirma
tion 0/ Fundamental Rights, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691 (1979) [hereinafter Fundamental
Rights). But see Hicklin, 437 U.S. 518; State v. Nolfi, 141 N.J. Super. 528, 358 A.2d 853
(1976); Note, supra note 14, at 107-110; Note, Domicile Priferences in Employment: The
Case ofAlaska Hire, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1069 [hereinafter Alaska Hire); Note, supra note 32.
68. See Ely, supra note 67, at 75-76.
69. 437 U.S. at 528.
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must pass the scrutiny of the substantial reason test. 70
The Hicklin balancing approach of privileges and immumtIes
analysis closely resembles the analysis of the commerce clause 71 and
the equal protection clause.72 Because these clauses are also federal
limitations on state and local power, the similarity in analysis lends
additional support for the validity of the Hicklin approach.
IV.

ANALYSIS

In MCCE, the residency preference was challenged on a variety
of grounds, both statutory and constitutional.7 3 Because none of the
statutory challenges invalidated the preference statute,74 the court
70. /d. at 527.
71. The commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause have a "mutu
'ally reinforcing relationship [due to) their common origin in the Fourth Article of the
Articles of Confederation." Id. at 531-32 (footnote omitted). See infra note 132 and
accompanying text. Hicklin acknowledged this relationship by invalidating the statute
on the basis of the privileges and immunities clause and used the commerce clause as a
gauge for improper discrimination. Id. Whether or not resources are destined for inter
state commerce becomes a factor in determining what permissible discriminations will be
allowed. Id. at 531-33. For similar commerce clause cases that invalidate state laws
discriminating against nonresidents in receiving goods of interstate commerce, see Fos
ter-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. I (1928); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). BUI see
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1978); Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S.
794 (1976); American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), affd mem.,
409 U.S. 904 (1972).
72. The closeness between the valid state interest and the resulting discrimination
of nonresidents required by the substantial reason test in Hicklin, resembles the interme
diate level of scrutiny applied in equal protection cases. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 67, at
86; Tribe, supra note 33, at 411 n.17. The standards used in Toomer and Austin v. New
Hampshire, 420 U.S. 696 (1975), have also been compared to the intermediate level of
scrutiny of equal protection. For a discussion of their relationship see Alaska Hire, supra
note 67, at 1081; Fundamen/al Righls, supra note 67, at 698-99.
F or cases that consider nonresident discrimination under an equal protection basis,
see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
73. See supra note lO and accompanying text.
74. One such challenge that failed was the preemption doctrine, which prevents a
state from frustrating a federal policy as promulgated under any federal statute. The
MCCE court held that the preference statute was not preempted under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because the statute did not interfere with the negotiation
process between the unions and the employers. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2046, 425 N.E.2d
at 351. The Massachusetts statute was neutral and did not alter the bargaining position
of either party. /d. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL
CIO v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Note, Slale Reg
ulalion of Employmen/ 0/ Illegal Aliens is nOI per se Preempled by Federal COn/rol over
Immigralion or by Ihe Immigralion and Nalionalily ACI, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 87 (1977).
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reached the constitutional issues, including the privileges and immu
nities clause.
The MCCE court cited Toomer, to establish the basic purpose
of the clause as being to secure to nonresidents the same privileges
that residents of the state enjoy.75 The court recognized that states
were not prevented from favoring their own citizens in certain cir
cumstances76 but that definite limitations existed on the preferential
methods that could pass constitutional muster.?7
The court followed the two step analytical framework of Bald
win ,78 which first determined if the right under consideration was
fundamental and, second, if the discrimination could be justified,
either by a showing that nonresidents were a peculiar source of the
evil that the statute was aimed to remedy, or if there was a valid
independent reason for the discrimination other than the mere fact
of nonresidency.79
The MCCE court cited Rubin v. Glaser80 and Lung v.
O'Cheskysl as examples of valid state discrimination against nonres
idents tested under the substantial reason doctrine. 82 In Rubin, a
New Jersey Homestead Rebate Act that applied only to the principal
residence of New Jersey residents was upheld. s3 The Act was en
acted to alleviate the heavy burden of realty taxes on the principal
place of residence of New Jersey residents. 84 The court justified the
decision on the basis that the Act was closely related to its purpose 85
and the Act did not discriminate solely against nonresidents. 86 In
Lung, the court upheld a grocery and medical tax rebate to New
75. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2046, 425 N.E.2d at 351. (citing Toomer, 334 U.S. at
395).
76. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (favoring state citizens in selling
concrete from a state-owned plant during shortages); Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371 (1978)
(charging nonresidents substantially higher license fees for recreational hunting).
77. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2047, 425 N.E.2d at 351. The court cited Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978), a commerce clause case, which sets the limits of
preferential treatment as whenever the state attempts to isolate itself from the national
economy.
78. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
79. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2047, 425 N.E.2d at 351.
80. 83 N.J. 299, 416 A.2d 382 (1980).
81. 94 N.M. 802,617 P.2d 1317 (1980).
82. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2047, 425 N .E.2d at 351.
83. 83 N.J. at 304, 416 A.2d at 384.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 307, 416 A.2d at 386-87.
86.. Id. Residents of New Jersey who rented or had a summer home did not qual
ify for the rebate and were discriminated against along with the nonresidents. Id.

1983)

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

775

Mexico residents. 87 The legitimate state purpose of granting relief
from gross receipts and property taxes to individuals who actually
paid those taxes, was the substantial reason for the distinction be
tween residents and nonresidents. 88
In assessing whether the statute discriminated against a funda
mental right, the MCCE court cited Coljield as having established
that the privileges and immunities clause protected the right of a citi
zen to go into another state for purposes of trade, agriculture and
professional pursuits. 89 After reviewing subsequent fundamental
right decisions,90 the court concluded that limiting a particular kind
of work opportunity on the basis of residency impinged upon the
fundamental right of pursuing a livelihood. 91
The second prong of the test in the MCCE decision is the sub
stantial reason test of Toomer.92 The MCCE court concluded that
Hicklin was controlling on these facts, and had established a clear
rule forbidding a state to use its control of a resource to create an
absolute hiring preference of residents. 93
The court rejected the two principle arguments used by the state
to distinguish Hicklin. First, the state claimed that the statute regu
lated employment, a limited resource, as opposed to an unlimited
resource like oil or gas. Secondly, the state argued, it was acting as a
market participant94 in the construction of projects and therefore
should be able to act, as in commerce clause cases, without the re
strictions of the privileges and immunities clause. 95
In considering the limited resource distinction, the court ac
knowledged that a state preference of residents could be allowed
when a resource was limited but noted that there must be a showing
that the resources were overburdened. 96 Hicklin also required a
87. 94 N.M. at 805, 617 P.2d at 1320.
88. Id. Since nonresidents did not pay those taxes, a rebate to them would not
further the relief contemplated by the legislature. Id.
89. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
90. The court also recognized that the right involved in MCCE was the pursuit of a
livelihood and cited Toomer and Baldwin in support. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2048, 425
N.E.2d at 352.
91. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2049, 425 N.E.2d at 352. See also Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Chalker v. Birmingham
& N.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 522 (1919); Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514,399 N.E.2d
909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979).
92. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
93. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2049-50, 425 N.E.2d at 352-53.
94. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
95. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2050, 425 N.E.2d at 353.
96. Id. This view is supported by dicta in Doe v. Bolton, 4\0 U.S. 179 (1973)
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showing that the nonresidents be the peculiar source ofthe evtl, when
unemployment was considered,97 and the MCCE court determined
that this was not shown. 98
The second argument by the state, the market participant doc
trine, has been a recognized exception to the commerce clause in
situations in which a state is acting in a proprietary manner in pro
viding or purchasing goods and services. 99 The rationale of the doc
trine is that when a state is pursuing its own proprietary business
interests instead of regulating private industry, it should be free to
choose with whom it will do business, just as any other individual
may. 100
The MCCE court followed precedent and agreed that the com
which intimated that if state facilities were utilized to capacity, a statute giving preferen
tial access to Georgia residents of these state owned facilities might be allowed. Id. at
200.
97. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
98. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2050, 425 N.E.2d at 353.
99. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), aJl'd mem.,
409 U.S. 904 (1972) (state proprietary functions are exempt from commerce clause scru
tiny). See also infra notes lOO-OJ.
100. The commerce clause does not concern itself with a state entering the market
place as a purchaser or prescribing the conditions under which a state will do business.
When a state is spending state money, courts seem to exempt the state from commerce
clause restrictions. Aside from this generalization that states do not have to spend state
money to promote the interests of nonresidents, no clear guidelines are available. See
Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction In Constitutional Law, 66
VA. L. REV. 1073. See also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexan
dria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp.
719 (M.D. Fla.), ajJ'dmem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972); People ex rei. Holland v. Bleigh Constr.
Co., 61 Ill. 2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975).
The market participant doctrine has been recently cited in Reeves as a valid consid
eration. 447 U.S. at 438. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1,58-63
(1976). The Reeves Court also referred to Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) in sup
port of the validity of the proprietary interest. 447 U.S. at 438-39.
Heim upheld a statute, similar to the MCCE statute, but on an equal protection
basis. 239 U.S. at 193. The Court in Hicklin referred to Heim as being of dubious value
in a privileges and immunities analysis. 437 U.S. at 531 n.15. The MCCE decision fol
lowed the Hicklin Court in not considering the value of Heim, which recognized the
proprietary interest of a state to "have control of its affairs, to prescribe the conditions
upon which it will permit public work to be done on its behalf. . . ." Heim, 239 U.S. at
191. The continuing vitality of this portion of Heim was recognized in C.D.R. Enter
prises v. Board of Educ. of New York, 412 F. Supp. 1164, 1169-70 (1976).
Heim and its companion case, Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) can be dis
tinguished from Hicklin. Both Heim and Crane involved purely public works construc
tion of subways and sewers and involved only state funds rather than employment in all
businesses connected with Alaska's oil and gas. Alaska Hire, supra note 67, at 1091.
Hicklin avoided the issue of whether a more narrowly drawn statute would allow a
state to properly prefer its residents on public works. Instead of examining Heim and
Crane, the Court believed the cases were not pertinent because they were decided upon
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merce clause would allow a state to prefer its own residents when it
was purchasing goods 101 or services,102 or distributing state-pro
duced materials. 103 But the court distinguished the commerce clause
cases by concluding that the market participant doctrine exception
extended only to a state granting an initial sale or contract. Further,
as the Supreme Court did not apply the doctrine to the absolute em
ployment preference statute in Hicklin, 104 the MCCE court was un
willing to extend the doctrine in the present case. 105
The court also cited Sal/a v. County of Monroe 106 in support of
its decision because the court in Sal/a invalidated a New York stat
ute nearly identical to the Massachusetts statute on a privileges and
an equal protection basis. 437 U.S. at 531 n.15. See Ely, SIIpra note 67, at 83 n.47; Knox,
supra note 17, at 22-24.
If the state is the employer and state funds are being spent to develop the resource,
Hicklin seems to indicate that the proprietary interests of the state may be controlling
and the regulation upheld if narrowly drawn. 437 U.S. at 528.
This is to be distinguished from municipal hiring cases. When a government is an
employer, it may impose restrictions on the activities of its employees as conditions of
further employment. This has been upheld based upon the permanence of and reliance
of the community on public service employment. Berg v. City of Minneapolis, 274 Minn.
277,143 N.W.2d 200 (1966). See also Wardell v. Board of Educ. of Cincinnati, 529 F.2d
625 (6th Cir. 1976); Town of Milton v. Civil Service Comm'n, 365 Mass. 368, 312 N.E.2d
188 (1974); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97
(1971).
.
101. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), where Maryland
offered a bounty for every junk car titled in Maryland that was converted into scrap. The
documentation required to be eligible for the bounty was more demanding on nonresi
dents than residents and the effect of the law restricted the flow of junk cars to nonresi
dent scrap companies. Id. at 801-03. The Supreme Court upheld the statute against a
commerce clause challenge because Maryland had not sought to prohibit the flow of
goods but instead entered the market and bid up the price as a purchaser thereby restrict
ing its trade to its own citizens. Id. at 808.
102. See American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), affd
mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972) (Florida statute requiring the state to obtain printing services
from in-state printers was upheld because state proprietary functions are exempt from
commerce clause scrutiny).
103. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). In Reeves, a South Dakota
statute that required favoring its citizens in the sale of cement produced from a state
owned plant during an actual shortage period was upheld. Id. at 436. The Court relied
on the market participant doctrine to allow the state, in the absence of congressional
action, to act without the restrictions of the commerce clause. Id. at 434-36. See also
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
104. 437 U.S. at 531.
105. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2051,425 N.E.2d at 353. Why the court did not con
sider the awarding of a public works construction project to be an initial granting of a
contract but rather relied on Hicklin once again is not indicated in the opinion.
106. 48 N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979), cerl. denied, 446
U.S. 909 (1980).
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immunities clause basis. 107
In Salla, the New York Court of Appeals emphasized two ma
jor facts in its decision. First, the broad statutory language did not
prefer unemployed over employed persons. \08 This was given con
siderable weight in Hicklin .109 Second, the public works projects in
Salla were largely funded by federal sources so that a valid market
participant doctrine argument could not be made. I \0
In conclusion, the MCCE court relied heavily on Hicklin as
controlling but did not distinguish the types of employment involved
in the two cases. The court also did not believe that the market par
ticipant doctrine applied to the MCCE fact situation.
An initial examination of Hinklin shows similarities to MCCE.
In both, the absolute preference was very broad because it favored
employed as well as unemployed residents over nonresidents. I II No
showing was made, in either court, that the nonresidents were the
peculiar source of the unemployment that the statute was aimed to
remedy.ll2 The alleviation of state unemployment, by excluding
nonresidents, is inconsistent with the purpose of the privileges and
immunities clause to promote comity and national economic unity
among the states.ll3 The MCCE decision correctly recognized these
similarities I 14 but failed to perceive the more subtle distinctions.
The major distinction between Hicklin and MCCE is the type of
employment that the statutes regulated. In Hicklin, the statute regu
lated all private employment generated by any oil and gas activity in
the state. I 15 The challenged Massachusetts law in MCCE was more
107. Id. at 518, 399 N.E.2d at 910, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
108. /d. at 523, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
109. /d. at 524-25, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
110. Id. The doctrine is premised on the state spending state money in its proprie
tary actions. See Knox, supra note 17, at 21.
The MCCE court did not reject the market participant doctrine on a similar federal
funding basis when it considered the statute, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2051, 425 N.E.2d at
353-54, but clearly did so when it invalidated the Executive Order. Id. at 2053, 425
N.E.2d at 355. If federal funds were involved in projects under the statute, a more credi
ble argument could be made that the market participant doctrine is inapplicable.
Ill. See supra notes 7 & 61 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 62 & 98 and accompanying text; Salla, 48 N.Y.2d at 523, 399
N.E.2d at 913-14, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882; Construction and Gen. Laborers Union Local 563
v. City of St. Paul, 270 Minn. 427, 134 N.W.2d 26 (distinctions in classifying persons
must be based on reasonable and substantial facts to justify the imposition of special
legislation).
113. See supra notes 18-72 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
115. 437 U.S. at 529-31. See generally Recent Cases, supra note 67, at 356; Alaska
Hire, supra note 67, at 1091.
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narrowly drawn and focused on a hybrid of public employment. 116
A public works project, whether done by the state or one of its in
strumentalities, is a public, not private, character, 117 and the employ
ment is a matter of major public concern. This distinction was
determinative in Holland v. Bleigh Construction Company,1l8 an Illi
nois case upholding a resident preference statute for the employment
of laborers on public works projects. The Holland court believed the
state had a valid interest in promoting the employment of its resi
dents if the degree of discrimination against nonresident laborers on
public works projects bore a close relation to this valid purpose. 119
While the MCCE defendants made the identical argument,120 the
court's opinion did not address it. l2l
Although the Massachusetts statute was more narrowly drawn
than Alaska's, the statute still preferred employed and unemployed
residents over unemployed nonresidents. There is no substantial
reason for preferring employed residents over unemployed nonresi
dents.122 This is particularly true, when the statute is seeking to alle
viate unemployment, since preferring employed residents does not
reduce unemployment. 123 The only reason for the discrimination,
therefore, would be to keep nonresidents from obtaining employ
ment within the state. This discrimination is based solely on resi
dency and has been expressly prohibited by Toomer .124 Therefore,
the discrimination cannot be justified and the MCCE decision would
remain unaltered.
Another distinction between Hicklin and MCCE is the nature of
the state involvement. In Hicklin, private employers leased state
land for oil and gas extraction, but there was no state funding or
other involvement. 125 The Supreme Court stated that land owner
116. Brief for Defendant Dept. of Labor and Ind. at 23, Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2039, 425 N.E.2d 346.
117. See Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 207 (1903).
118. 61 III. 2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975).
119. Id. at 273, 335 N.E.2d at 478-79.
120. Brief of Defendant Dept. of Labor and Ind. at 17, supra note 116. The statute
was reasonably and substantially related to the valid state interest of securing "the appro
priate allocation of public funds for the benefit of its residents without unduly impairing
the constitutionally protected interests of nonresidents." Id.
121. This provides support for this note's premise that the MCCE opinion did not
consider all the issues presented to the court.
122. See supra note 5.
123. Filling vacant jobs with a person already employed only creates another va
cant position. Therefore, unemployment is not decreased but remains the same.
124. 334 U.S. at 396.
125. 437 U.S. at 530. The Alaskan statute applied to employers who have "no
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ship alone could not justify the Alaska plan. 126 In MCCE, the Com
monwealth of Massachusetts owned the land on which the public
works projects were to be built. It also funded the projects, designed
them and supervised their construction. The state was in full control
and had a continuing intimate interest.
The Supreme Court has labeled state ownership as a crucial fac
tor in the balancing approach of the privileges and immunities anal
ysis. 127 Under the substantial reason test, a court must consider state
ownership of property in determining whether the discrimination
against nonresidents violates the privileges and immunities clause.
In this respect, the ownership theory still has some vitality today but
any power a state has over a resource must be exercised within the
confines of the constitutional guarantees. 128
It can be argued that state expenditure of funds to procure pub
lic works construction is a type of resource management and there
fore would come under the McCready doctrine. 129 At the very least,
it would make the ownership of state funds and property a crucial
factor in determining the validity of the statute. The McCready doc
trine by itself would not justify a reversal of the MCCE decision
because the Massachusetts statute cannot pass the substantial reason
test as long as employed residents are preferred over unemployed
nonresidents. The MCCE decision, however, would have been more
exemplary if the court had gone through the analysis. Instead, the
court's opinion failed to include this doctrine entirely, despite its im
connection whatsoever with the State's oil and gas, perform no work on state land, have
no contractual relationship with the State, and receive no payment from the Stale." Id.
(emphasis added).
126. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
127. 437 U.S. at 528-29. See also Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402; Salla, 48 N.Y.2d at 524,
399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
128. Recent Cases, supra note 67, at 360. Toomer expressed a similar view that the
McCready doctrine, or the special property right of a state in its resources, is a fiction
stating that a state has power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of its resources.
But this must be done within the Constitutional command, not to discriminate without
reason against citizens of another state. 334 U.S. at 402.
McCready and Corfteld can no longer be viewed as valid on a basis other than an
ownership theory. Both cases tried to limit employment in extracting and planting shell
fish for their citizens. When viewed in this light, there is no justification to limit employ
ment to state citizens. Courts are unlikely to consider employment as the common
property of a state and therefore a McCready exception to barriers to nonresident em
ployment is inappropriate. Alaska Hire, supra note 67, at 1076-78. But see Ebbeson v.
Board of Public Educ., 156 A.286 (1931) where the McCready doctrine was used to up
hold an employment preference statute in public works and allow the state to prefer its
own citizens in receiving benefits from its common property to its common owners.
129. See supra note 65.
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portance, in determining the validity of a statute. 130
Another potential exception to the restrictions of the privileges
and immunities clause, the market participant doctrine,13I was su
perficially rejected by the court in the MCCE decision. Arguably,
the market participant doctrine can be applied to MCCE because of
the "mutually reinforcing relationship between the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of [Article] IV . .. and the Commerce
Clause."132 The doctrine would allow Massachusetts to favor its res
idents when the state spent its own money in the construction of
public works. This favoritism could take the form of qualifying the
terms of any contract into which the state entered. Those terms may
well be that an employer, constructing public works funded by state
money, would have to hire unemployed residents before nonresi
dents to complete the project. 133 This condition goes only to the first
level of contract between the state and the contractor, and therefore,
would still be a valid proprietary interest of the state. 134
The statute would still be required to meet the substantial
reason test but the market participant doctrine would weigh in the
overall balancing of interests like any other factor under considera
tion. 135 A state may not, however, have a requirement that all busi
130. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
132. 437 U.S. at 531. Although the Court has considered the two clauses as com
plementary, there is no case that explicitly allows the market participant doctrine to be
applied in privileges and immunities clause decisions. Rather, the Court has implicitly
stated the proposition. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385 (1948); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195
(1915); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391
(1876).
133. This condition, that the contractor would have residents of Massachusetts
completing the construction project whether they were his own employees or a subcon
tractor's, prevents the contractor from circumventing the condition by having subcon
tractors do the work with nonresidents. The court distinguished the defendants'
argument on this point but failed to see that this condition, like other valid market par
ticipant cases, only applied to the initial contract. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2051, 425
N.E.2d at 353.
134. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
In Sa/la, the dissenting opinion thought this issue was determinative. The privileges
and immunities clause, like the commerce clause, does not restrict a state in its proprie
tary actions or its spending power. The New York statute was directed only at jobs
created by New York's exercise of its spending power. 48 N.Y.2d at 526-27,399 N.E.2d
at 916, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 884-85.
135. The dissent in Sal/a stated that this argument was enough to sway the balance
in favor of finding the statute valid under a privileges and immunities analysis when the
statute was directed only at jobs that the state had created by exercising its spending
power. 48 N.Y.2d at 526-27, 399 N.E.2d at 915-16, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 884-85.
This view was also mentioned in Doe. If the state regulation had been concerned

782

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:763

nesses in the state give hiring preferences to residents because this
would be an unreasonable regulation under Hicklin .136 The
Supreme Court stated in Hicklin that Alaska had little or no proprie
tary interest in the activities swept within the broad reach of the stat
ute.137 Massachusetts, however, did not attempt to regulate all
businesses, as in Hicklin, because the statute only applied to those
businesses that were constructing public works. The MCCE court
did not consider the market participant doctrine in this light and ne
glected to appreciate this valid distinction. Instead, the court inap
propriately relied upon Hicklin and rejected the defendants
argument. 138
Even if the market participant doctrine had been considered by
the court, however, the outcome of the MCCE decision would not
ha ve been different. While the doctrine is a factor to be considered,
it does not provide a valid justification for the absolute preference of
employed residents over unemployed nonresidents. The market par
ticipant doctrine remains as an important factor to be considered in
the delicate balancing process of the privileges and immunities
clause analysis. It is imperative that courts consider every factor so
that this analysis will not be short-circuited.
A proper privileges and immunities clause analysis of the
MCCE case would examine the statutory language and the facts
presented to determine if nonresidents were the peculiar source of the
unemployment that the statute sought to alleviate. The decision
would have also balanced Massachusetts' proprietary interest, to
build and finance public works projects, against the right of nonresi
dents to be free from discrimination based solely on residency. This
process would ensure that a substantial reason existed for the dis
crimination practiced upon the nonresidents.
The Massachusetts statute does not meet the substantial reason
test because it established a preference for all residents, whether emwith the spending of state monies, the state could prefer its own residents. Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973). See also Knox, supra note 17, at 21. Following this view, it seems
clear that Massachusetts could have limited its public works contracts to residents.
136. 437 U.S. at 531.
137. Id. at 529. Alaska sold and leased land to private individuals and then re
quired those individuals to hire only residents. This is a pure regulation and not a pro
prietary interest. See Knox, supra note 17, at 19 n.115, 23. But see Wells & Hellerstein,
supra note 100, at IllS, 1129 (a desire to provide employment for its own residents is
politically motivated and not a proprietary interest); Knox, supra note 17, at 24 (allowing
states to avoid privileges and immunities clause restrictions by merely asserting their
regulations are proprietary interests).
138. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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ployed or unemployed. The statute was not aimed at the peculiar
source of the evil, because employed residents do not contribute to
unemployment. Even considering the factor of Massachusetts' pro
prietary interests in the land it owns and the funds it spends does not
sufficiently mask the discrimination or avoid the conclusion that the
policy behind the statute is geographic exclusion.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Massachusetts employment preference statute on public
works construction cannot withstand the scrutiny of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution because it
was not directed at the peculiar source oJ the evil that the statute
sought to remedy. The MCCE decision minimized any detrimental
consequences to the construction industry by allowing contractors to
operate in a conventional manner by keeping an intact skilled work
force without reference to residency. The net result will be lower
costs in the construction of public works projects due to decreased
operating costs, increased work force efficiency and more competi
tive bids.139 Although the decision is correct in the final analysis, it
is lacking an in-depth analysis of the issues. Litigation has been in
creasing in the past decade under the privileges and immunities
clause and it would have been beneficial had the court provided
more guidelines to help clear the confusion that has traditionally
surrounded the clause.
The substantial reason test requires the court to examine the
statute to determine if it is properly aimed at the source of the prob
lem it seeks to remedy. It also requires that there be a substantial
relationship between the valid state goal and the discrimination
practiced. Applying the first part of the substantial reason analysis
as the court did, one concludes, the statute is not aimed at the pecu
liar source of the evil. The statute established a preference for all
residents whether employed or unemployed and is therefore not
closely tailored. For this reason, the statute cannot be upheld under
the privileges and immunities clause.
The court did not stop at this point in the decision but went on
to examine some other potential justifications of the statute. This
portion of the decision, however, did not consider the important doc
trines that other courts have considered to justify state discrimina
139. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, supra note I; Salla v. County of
Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d at 524, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
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tion against nonresidents: namely, the market participant and the
McCready doctrines.
If the court had examined these judicially created exceptions, as
it should have in a proper substantial reason test, it might have
found that the Massachusetts statute was distinguishable from Hick
lin. The statute covered only a limited area of employment in the
construction of public works and set the conditions that a private
party would have to meet in order to do business with the state. Be
cause this is a condition that extends only to the first level of con
tract, it is a valid proprietary action of the state.
State ownership of the property and the funds to finance the
construction of public works is a crucial factor, as is the valid state
proprietary function of favoring the residents of the state in expendi
ture of those funds. These factors, combined with the more narrow
extent that this statute discriminated against nonresidents compared
with Hicklin, shows that enough distinctions between MCCE and
Hicklin existed for the court to provide a more detailed analysis of
the privileges and immunities clause restriction.
A proper privileges and immunities analysis would have consid
ered the valid distinctions between MCCE and Hicklin. The court
would have weighed the market participant and McCready doctrines
as well as considered the language of the statute to determine
whether the statute unreasonably discriminated against nonresi
dents. This omission by the court seriously affects the force and use
fulness of its decision.
If the statute had been drawn to prefer only unemployed resi
dents rather than all residents, the critical flaw of the statute, the
court intimated that it would have affirmed the law. In this situa
tion, the exceptions to privileges and immunities clause scrutiny
would then shift the balance to weigh in favor of the state. Thus,
Massachusetts may validly prefer its unemployed residents, when it
decides to spend state money on the construction of public works,
and provide benefits to those people who have contributed to the
state funds.
John Lauring

